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What information does PrivateSend conceal, and by what method?
An implementation of CoinJoin, Mixing multi-owners’ coins in a big transaction and send back with a new address that belongs to the multi-owners. it breaks connection of owners and their addresses to provide the conceal. -
How do masternodes improve on the initial CoinJoin proposal?
Private Send uses a random masternode to mix different users’ coin and build the CoinJoin transaction. -
Alice send some DASH to Bob using PrivateSend. Describe how an attacker could link their addresses.
By hacking a masternode that generate Alice’s CoinJoin address and tracing the address could find the linked address between Alice and Bob. -
In what way could PrivateSend be more risky than a normal Bitcoin Transaction?
There is a hacked Masternode that processes the transactions because masternode knows all source addresses and receiving addresses.
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Private send conceals which sender sent which coin to which receiver. It does this through CoinJoin, however in Private Send each CoinJoin transaction is constructed by Masternodes.
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The only improvement I see (not really worth it though) is that it makes CoinJoining easier for the user. One simply uses a drop-down menu in the GUI and trusts the Mastenode to do all the work.
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They could be linked if the attacker gained access to the records of the Masternode that constructed the transaction. Also, if a large enough number of Masternodes were actually owned by a single entity, then doing multiple rounds using random Masternodes might not be effective. In addition, Government might have spies in the companies that host the Virtual Private Servers that host many Masternodes. Governemnts (or other attackers) may even themselves own Masternodes.
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In addition to the possibilities mentioned in #3 above, in Private Send, the fact that youve chosen that method of sending coins is also marking yourself as someone seeking privacy, opening you up to more scrutiny.
- information about who issues and who receives a payment and ownership of the coins.
2.A masternode collects the coins from different users, mixes them together in the CoinJoin Transaction
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The mixing masternodes can link the sending and receiving addresses together; they know exactly which coins are going where.
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Masternodes could be run by government agencies, spies, analytics companies and other interested parties
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DASH uses Coinjoin which was described already in the previous assignment. With PrivateSend the information which spender pays which recipient is concealed.
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The masternodes are responsible and create the transactions. They collect the coins from differet users and mix them together in one CoinJoin transaction. The masternode cannot steal the coins. The improvement here is that there is no need for a multisig transaction (maybe this is wrong!). The different users dont have to agree and collaborate together and also the risk of a failed transaction is minimized because the transaction don´t have to be signed by all participants.
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A disadvantage is that the users have to trust a masternode with their privacy. The masternode knows exactly who is sending which amount to which address. The masternode could be hacked or run by spies which means they can link the sender and receiver address.
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You have to trust a masternode which means there is a third party involved which you have to trust. You even don´t know how is behind this masternode. A normal bitcoin transaction is therefore less riskier because there is no middlemen involved and everything is based on a protocol (TRUSTLESS).
Q1: Private Send conceals the trail of ownership of the coins by implementing CoinJoin’s method of TXs using Dash’s master nodes.
Q2: The master nodes automatically construct the TX making the process easier for us.
Q3: By compromising the master node that the Alice used to send Bob Dash or compromising someone within the org. running the master nodes.
Q4: Private Send assumes the people conducting this TX want to remain private and anonymous for personal reasons and when these master nodes get compromised by gov. agencies they will pay closer attention to the TXs that wish to remain private.
- It conceals the addresses by mixing them together and sending out a bigger transaction by using Dash’s Masternode system. This is very similar to coinjoin.
- The masternodes take the coins from whoever wants to participate, so the user don’t have to do much.
- Well, if the Masternode is intervened by someone or some agency, they can basically see who is who and what’s what…the article talks abut that 25% of the coins were mined in the first week…so someone out there has a lot of power.
- Well, using Bitcoin in a normal Tx, no one can see who you are unless you use the same address repeatedly vs PrivateSend that could be intervened and then it all goes to waste.
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What information does PrivateSend conceal, and by what method?
it conceals the trail of ownership of the coins mixed together. it does so by implementing the coinjoin proposal by Maxwell. -
How do masternodes improve on the initial CoinJoin proposal?
the masternodes make processing of these coinjoin transactions very simple. -
Alice send some DASH to Bob using PrivateSend. Describe how an attacker could link their addresses.
the mixing masternodes can link the sending and receiving addresses together, they know exactly which coins are going where if these masternodes are run by spies or share their information with spies. -
In what way could PrivateSend be more risky than a normal Bitcoin Transaction?
if the MasterNode were run by ill-intentioned people they would have access to the information related to those parties asking for the PrivateSend servie, leading to risks of exposure or other personal attacks.
- Private Send hides the connection between the sender and the recipient, thanks to the mixing of the coins of all the participants in a single transaction. The CoinJoin method applied by the masternodes is used.
- Interested parties agree on the amount of coins to be placed individually within the transaction. The masternode takes care of mixing together all the coins in a single transaction and only it can know the quantity of coin and to whom it will be sent.
- If he runs a masternode or if a masternode passes the information to him.
- The masternodes could be managed by spies, government agencies or people who want to be in control.
1 - What information does PrivateSend conceal, and by what method?
PrivateSend conceals the sender receiver transaction link by adding two additional sender coins to construct one transaction of the three. This transaction sends the coins to newly generated addresses that belong to the three senders. This has the effect of mixing the coins between the three participants and disrupts the blockchain trail of ownership between the three. This mixing may occur as much as 8 times.
2 - How do masternodes improve on the initial CoinJoin proposal?
Masternode is used by Private Send to construct the CoinJoin transaction. A random masternode is selected by Dash users that wish to mix their coins, who collects the coins from the different users, and mixes them together in the CoinJoin transaction.
Masternode cannot steal sender coins.
3 - Alice send some DASH to Bob using PrivateSend. Describe how an attacker could link their addresses.
Since masternodes perform the actual mixing of the coins, they can assemble the sending and receiving address associations. Masternodes know exactly which coins are going where, thus a malicious acter, internal to the masternodes, can expose this association.
4 - In what way could PrivateSend be more risky than a normal Bitcoin Transaction?
While bitcoin is open to be analyzed by Government agencies and analytics companies, PrivateSend uses masternodes. These masternodes may be run by Government agencies.
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PrivateSend conceals the identity of the owners of the cryprocurrency by mixing the crpyto of multiple users and then sending these to fresh new addresses.
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Masternodes improve on the CoinJoin proposal by constructing the CoinJoin transaction.
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An attacker can link their addresses if the Masternode is run by an attacker or if the Masternode shares it’s information with the attacker.
4.PrivateSend is more risky as many Masternodes seem to be operating from virtual servers that can be easily breached at once. Also multiple Masternodes could be under the command of one individual which means switching between them is futile.
- What information does PrivateSend conceal, and by what method?
- This is basically coinjoin. 3 users add their coins together into one large transaction which sends the coins to the freshly created addresses of the same three users. The coins are effectively mixed and the chain of custody is broken. this can be repeated upto 8 times with different people participating in the mixing.
- How do master-nodes improve on the initial CoinJoin proposal?
- The master nodes cant steal the coins and private send doesnt need require someone to construct the CoinJoin transaction.
- Alice send some DASH to Bob using PrivateSend. Describe how an attacker could link their addresses.
- The attacker needs to own the masternode where the mixing and the relation ship between the transacting parties is documented
- In what way could PrivateSend be more risky than a normal Bitcoin Transaction?
- Bitcoin can use the ZeroLink framework to unlink the sending and recieving addresses without needing to trust anyone. Dashs private send function cannot do this.
- TXNs link between public keys. By mashing up the cons in the CoinJoin TXNs.
- Masternodes can’t steal the coin.
- If bad actor has access to masternode.
- If masternode is a bad actor.
- What information does PrivateSend conceal, and by what method?
Private Send conceals information about link between sender and recipient by implementation of CoinJoin mixing service.
- How do masternodes improve on the initial CoinJoin proposal?
Dash users that wish to mix their coins contact a random masternode, which then collects the coins from the different users, and mashes them together in the CoinJoin transaction thus breaking the trail of ownership on the blockchain.
- Alice send some DASH to Bob using PrivateSend. Describe how an attacker could link their addresses.
If attacker compromises masternode used for generating CoinJoin transaction between Alice and Bob, he can easily link their addresses since the history of mixing is still visible in that masternode.
- In what way could PrivateSend be more risky than a normal Bitcoin Transaction?
Private Send requires of users to take the specific step of mixing, which in turn takes time, effort and comes with a (modest) fee. As such, only users who care about privacy are likely to partake in the mixing process. This has the potential downside that mixing itself could be considered suspect and therefore draw more attention than regular Bitcoin transaction. Not to mention that much safer CoinJoin service is available on Bitcoin.
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Dash has a feature, PrivateSend, which conceals links between txs. The method used is, three users add their coins together in one big transaction, that sends the coins to freshly generated addresses belonging to the same three users. As such, the coins are effectively mixed between the three participants, breaking the blockchain trail of ownership between them. This process can be automatically repeated up to eight times, with (hopefully) different mixing participants, for extra privacy.
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Masternodes improve on the initial CoinJoin proposal. Private Send does require someone to construct the CoinJoin transaction. This is done using Dash’s masternode system. Dash users that wish to mix their coins contact a random masternode, which then collects the coins from the different users, and mashes them together in the CoinJoin transaction. It’s important to note that the masternode cannot steal the coins.
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The way an attacker could link addresses are Dash users must trust the masternodes with their privacy. After all, the mixing masternodes can link the sending and receiving addresses together; they know exactly which coins are going where. If these masternodes are run by spies or share their information with spies (on purpose or by accident), the Dash users gain less than nothing: They don’t have privacy, while revealing that they would have liked to have privacy. masternodes appear to be run from virtual private servers that could be compromised relatively easily in one go, for example by government-sponsored spies. Further, many masternodes could be controlled by the same people (keep in mind that some 25 percent of all coins were mined in the first week), which means switching between them might not even help that much.
It’s also worth noting that Private Send does require users to take the specific step of mixing, which in turn requires time, effort and comes with a (modest) fee. As such, only users who care about privacy are likely to partake in the mixing process; users who feel they have nothing to hide will not. This has the potential downside that mixing itself could be considered suspect. And while the trail of ownership is broken on the blockchain, the history of mixing is still visible.
- PrivateSend could e more riskythan a normal Bitcoin transaction because the most notable and powerful CoinJoin solution available today is Chaumian CoinJoin, which is embedded in the ZeroLink framework, which is, in turn, implemented in the Wasabi Wallet as well as the Bob Wallet and announced for Samourai Wallet.
Similar to Private Send, ZeroLink lets users add their coins together in one big transaction, which sends all these coins to freshly generated addresses belonging to the same users. But importantly, and unlike Private Send, the mixer is in this case unable to link the sending and receiving addresses. Clever cryptography helps break the link, without needing to trust anyone.
While Dash does, with its GUI-interface, offer a more user-friendly CoinJoin solution at this point in time, the privacy guarantees are weaker than on Bitcoin — never mind serious contenders like Monero or Zcash. Needless to say, for a cryptocurrency that is, or at least was, promoted as a privacycoin, this is quite disappointing.
- What information does PrivateSend conceal, and by what method?
It conceals ownership of coin by implementing CoinJoin by masternode. - How do masternodes improve on the initial CoinJoin proposal?
It joins several transactions into one. - Alice send some DASH to Bob using PrivateSend. Describe how an attacker could link their addresses.
The attacker would have to run masternode and by doing that he/she knows sender and recepient. - In what way could PrivateSend be more risky than a normal Bitcoin Transaction?
Masternodes have to be trusted
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The information that PrivateSend conceals is the trail of ownership. It does this by mixing the coins together in one transaction and then sends them to freshly generated addresses that belong to the same users.
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Masternodes improve on the initial CoinJoin proposal by the fact that they are unable to steal the coins in the transactions.
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An attacker could link Alice and Bob’s addresses by compromising the masternode which connects their sending and receiving address.
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PrivateSend could be more risky than a normal Bitcoin transaction in the sense that if the transaction is compromised, not only will the users have lost their privacy, but they would also have revealed that they wanted privacy.
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PrivateSend conceals which address sent how much in a transaction. It compiles transactions from multiple users, and generates a new set of addresses equal to the number of participating users. This breaks the blockchain trail of ownership.
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Masternodes improve on the initial CoinJoin proposal by lessening the centralization in the process. It is still broken up in the network, and no individual or party compiles the transaction.
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An attacker could link together Alice and Bob’s addresses if they were to successfully spy on the masternodes and have the information they do.
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You are trusting the masternodes, and running your transaction(s) through the system multiple times as opposed to sending it directly to the recipient.
- PrivateSend uses CoinJoin method to conceal the link between transaction parties.
- Masternodes collect the coins from three users and mashes them together in the CoinJoin transaction.
- Masternodes can’t steal the coins, but users have to trust masternode since it can link the sending and receiving parties together. Many masternodes appear to be running on VPS and it would be easy to compromise them in one go by government-sponsored spies. Moreover, some of the masternodes may already be running by a spy.
- Given that Dash user may use masternodes controlled by spies, they will not get a privacy they are looking for, moreover their actions will be considered suspect since they want to hide something.
- users addresses and amount of transactions made by doing the method of CoinJoin
- by making it instantly confirming each transaction of Dash
- by performing as a spy in the masternodes and collecting data in it
- by letting the masternodes can be controlled by the same people
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What information does PrivateSend conceal, and by what method?
Similar to CoinJoin - but working with local masternodes for the transaction to be masked. Although it does not require to mix at all. -
How do masternodes improve on the initial CoinJoin proposal?
By working privately with the transaction parties, and mixing the coins together. -
Alice send some DASH to Bob using PrivateSend. Describe how an attacker could link their addresses.
Since masternodes link the sending and receiving party addresses they know the amounts. -
In what way could PrivateSend be more risky than a normal Bitcoin Transaction?
PrivateSend does not require the mixing- masternodes could be run by bad actors which could extract information that was trusted to the masternode.